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Tuesday, Aug. 8, Program
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Panel
Hon. John R. Brown
Hon. C. William O'Neill
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of Ohio
Hon. Aaron Steuer
Senior Judge, New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division
First Department
Hon. Mary M. Schroeder
Judge
Court of Appeals
Division One
Phoenix
Hon. Wade H. Mccree, Jr.
Dean Dorothy W. Nelson
University of South California Law School

•

Advocates
Professor Charles Alan Wright
Hon. Daniel M. Friedman

•

/
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Program, Tuesday, August 8

8/3/78

DECISIONS WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) - summary
dispos i tion of cases on appeal (appe l late jurisdiction).
Have precedent i al effect.
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425

u.s~

901

11976) - consentual sodomy criminal statute sustained.
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) Extending Monroe v. Pape to require no exhaustion of state
administrative remedies •

Brown v. Board of Education was extended several

•

times by affirmances without oral a r gument:
New Orleans City Park Ass'n. v. Detiege,
358 U.S. 54 (public parks).
Gale v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (buses).
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(golf cou r ses).

* * *
The Court has even reversed summarily:
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
(Pennsylvania stop and f r isk case).
Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S.
100 (an equal protection issue).
Berry v. Doles, June 26, 1978 - the Voting

•

Rights Act case from Georgia.

-

LFP/vsl
July 31, 1978

Is Elimination of Oral Argument Worth It?

Article in Washington University Law Quarterly
by Professor Haworth makes clear that the magnitude of the
caseload problem -- worsening each year -- required drastic
measures.
Increased productivity -- principal benefits of

----=--------------

summary procedures (eliminating oral argument and written
opinions).
In 1972 (latest figures presented by Professor
Haworth), 59.1 % of CAS's cases were disposed of without oral

~

argument; 26.8 % without opinions.
output resulted:

Remarkable increase in

in five-year period ended 1972, CAS's case

~ output per active judge increased 90%
_./

(ask Chief Judge Brown).

Professor Carrington says time saved is insignificant.
The answers to Professor Carrington include:
(a) Pre-argument preparation is minimized, as only

7

one issue is presented at the screening stage -- whether
argument would be helpful.
(b) In argued cases, all three judges and their
clerks -- not knowing who will be assigned the opinion -prepare exhaustively.

Some of this duplication is eliminated

in the CAS practice where the original screening judge always

-

is assigned the opinion.
(c) Geography and logistics.

?

-

2•

Notes on Oral Argument -- Pre-Screening

CA5 (the Pioneer) Pre-decision Screening
Rule 47 (Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure)
authorizes Courts of Appeals to make local rules of practice.
Following CA5's lead, all circuits -- except CA2 -now have local rules regarding oral argument.
Some circuits dispense with oral argument only if
the appeal is frivolous or the court lacks jurisdiction.
In majority of circuits test is whether oral argu-

-

ment is unnecessary ("would not be of ~ssistance to the Court'').
CA5 (Local Rules 17, 18, 20 and 21) has far-reaching
screening for denying oral argument.

It recognizes four classes

of cases:
Class 1

frivolous appeals;

Class 2

appeals presenting substantial questions,
but the panel decides argument would not
be helpful;

Class 3

only 15 minutes allowed;

Class 4

30 minutes per side allowed.

If the designated judge on the panel classifies the
case as Class 3 or 4, the screening process ends, and the case
is set for argument -- either 15 or 30 minutes.

-

r~t-

-

3.

If the judge places the case in Class 1 or 2, the
other two judges on the panel review it.

Any judge on the

panel may require argument, and the case is argued.

Or, after

an opinion is circulated, if a judge disagrees, the case
automatically is restored to the argument calendar.
Counsel are advised if the case is placed on the
summary calendar without argument.

In theory, I understand

they may object.
Three-fold safeguard exists:

(i) every decision

in the process is made by a judge -- not by a law clerk;

-

-

(ii) the decision to place on the summary calendar (eliminate
oral argument) must be unanimous; and (iii) the final decision
of the Court on the merits also must be unanimous.

-

4.

Validity of Disposition Without Argument

Due Process
No case has ever held that due process requires
oral argument before an appellate court.
CAS -- in several cases by Judge Brown -- sustained
validity.

See, e.g., Huth v. Southern Pacific Company;*

Isbell Enterprises.
Supreme Court regularly decides cases without oral
argument:
(a)

-

affirmance of three-judge court decisions, and

appeals from state courts involving substantial federal questions;
(b)

per curiam opinions.

For example:

(c)

other Supreme Court decisions:
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373
(1908) -- due process required
opportunity "to be heard" before
Denve~
t,x Council with respect
to an ordl nance apportioning
paving costs among abutting
property owners.

-

*

Judge Brown relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
FCC v. WJR, the Goodwill Station, holding that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require
oral argument before federal administrative tribunals.

-

5.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 395 U.S. 254
(1970) -- held that a hearing -"an effective opportunity.
to present arguments and evidence
orally" -- is required.
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S.
468 (1936) -- involving fixing of
rates by the Secretary of Agriculture for stockyard services,
the Court required an opportunity
to be heard, but said that "argument may be oral or written."
Comment:

Although the distinction between Morgan

(written submission deemed sufficient) and Londoner and
Goldberg (oral argument required) is not made clear, the

-

Court has repeatedly recognized in subsequent procedural due
process cases that due process is a "flexible" concept -- and
that courts must consider various factors (the need, complexity, burden on the state, post-hearing, etc.).
opinion ~

~ -

(See my

See also cases subsequent to Goldberg,

such as Arnett, Di-Chem, Fuentes, and Ingraham v. Wright.)
Liberty or Property Interest?

In procedural due

process cases the threshhold question is whether a liberty
or property interest is implicated.

This normally would be

an irrelevant inquiry with respect to appellate oral argument.
Oral argument itself is not such an interest.

The case on

its merits may involve such an interest, but there would have
been a hearing below.

-

-

6.

The rules of the Court of Appeals create no more
than a mere expectancy that oral argument may be granted.
There is no creation by rule of any right.

28 U.S.C.

§

46 of Judicial Code

This section, relating to the function of Courts
of Appeals, speaks of "the hearing and determination of cases"
and directs that "cases and controversies shall be heard and
determined.

"

Reliance is placed on the words "hearing and determination'' and "hear" in Section 46(b) and "heard and deter-

-

mined" in Section 46(c) -- by those who argue that oral
argument is required.
But statutory history does not support this argument.

(This is Professor Haworth's view.)
The phrase "to hear and determine'' is of English

derivation, used to grant power to the early English courts,
not to distinguish between oral and written proceedings.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34
Rule 34 provides that "unless otherwise provided
by rule for all cases or classes of cases, each side will be
allowed thirty minutes for argument

-

"

-

7.

The language of this rule -- "for all cases or
classes of cases" -- if read literally, would not allow
discretion with respect to oral argument of individual cases
on the basis of whether this would be "helpful."

But the

Courts of Appeals have not viewed Rule 34 and prohibiting
local rules with respect to oral argument.

In any event,

the Rules of Appellate Procedure can be changed by the
appellate courts.

-

-
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JUDICIAL
11 55 EAST 60T H S T ., C HI C AG O , ILLIN O IS 60637

ADMINISTRATION

TELE PHO NE (3 1 2) 9 4 7-4000

DIVISION
LAWYERS

April 14, 1978

CONFERENCE
CHAIRMAN
R . Stanley Lowe
97 Primrose
Casper. WY 82601

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

u. S. Supreme Court Bldg.

PAST CHAIRMAN
Howard Stern
125 Ellison St.
Paterson , NJ 07505

Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAIRMAN-E L ECT
DeW itt W illi ams
P 0 . Box 21926
Seattle, WA 98101

Dear Justice Powell:

VI CE-C H AIRMAN
Paul F. Murray
2 Kay Street
Newport , RI 02840

Judge Paul H. Roney and I are Co-Chairmen of
a program that is being presented in the Courthouse of
the Appellate Division, First Department, of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, in New York City on
Tuesday, August 8, 1978, between 9:15 A.M. and 11:30 A.M.
Th
me of the pro
mis "Should Oral Argument on
Appeal be Abolished unless Requested by the Court?" The
co-sponsors are the Appellate Justices Conference and
the Lawyers Conference of the Judicial Administration
Division of the American Bar Association.

SECRETARY
Jo-Ann G r ace
438 S. Mansfie ld
Los Angeles , CA 90036
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
James P. Economos
111 W. Washington
Suite 2137
Chicago , IL 60602
Rex J . H anson
702 Kearns Bldg .
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Thomas S . Jackson
1828 " L" St NW
Washington . DC 20036
Ne

John A . Sutro
P.O . B ox 7880
San Fra't,.;i sco. CA 94120

9l6L 81 Hd

We are very excited about this program because
of the interest in the subject matter and because it is
The format
1 being presented in this landmark courthouse.
' is to have seven members of the judiciary who would be
representative of the various appellate courts throughout the nation and two advocates who would be presenting
opposite views before the bench. Commentary would certainly be invited from the bench.

.~·

:ON FERENCE
TO JAD COUNCIL
Florence R. Peskoe
State House Annex
Room 432
Trenton , NJ 08625
Jerome A . Hochberg
1990 " M " Street , N.W .
Was h ington . DC 20036
STAFF D I RECTOR
Stephen Goldspiel
1155 E. 60th Street
Chicago , IL 60637
(312 ) 947-3981

It is our understanding that you are attending
the annual meeting in August in New York City. We
would greatly appreciate your participation in this program.
Therefore, I would very much appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about this matter after you
have read this letter as well as a letter that Judge
Roney is sending to you.
I will telephone you in the
coming week.
We trust we will have the pleasure of your
presence at our meeting.

LS/epo

-

-

;

SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR ABA PROGRAM
on
NEED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON APPE~LS
(A Judicial Administration Division Program Co-Sponsored by
The Lawyers Conference and the Appellate Judges' Conference)

DATE:

Tuesday, August 8, 1978

PLACE:

Courthouse
Appellate Division
First Department
27 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

TIME:

9:30 to 11:30 a.m.

GENERAL
APPROACH:

[2 Hour Program]

Conduct program as an appellate argument
addressing this issue:
SHOULD APPELLATE ORAL ARGUMENT
BE DISPENSED WITH UNLESS DESIRED
BY THE COURT?

l

·I

~

0

OPENING
REMARKS:

The case could be treated as an appeal from
intermediate court which denied oral argument
over objection of counsel, or the court could
be addressed in its rulemaking power.
To avoid
presentation as a legislative, legal, or
constitutional matter, it may be that the
question should be argued as if concerned with
the c~urt's supervisory power in its rulemaking
capacity.

-

COURT PANEL:

U. S. Supreme Court Justice
Chief Judge of

u.

S. Circuit Court

State Justice from a State Certiorari Court
of Last Resort
Judge from a State Intermediate Appellate
Court
Professor of Law
Prominent Appellate Attorney
Prominent Appellate Attorney
[NOTE:

ADVOCATES:

1.

For decision without Oral Argument in certain
cases (20 minutes opening, 10 minutes rebuttal)

2.

For no decision without Oral Argument, unless
waived (30 minutes)

[NOTE:

FOLLOWING
ARGUMENTS:

If bench can accommodate, might use
9 judges]

It would be assumed that the court will
be well b f i t led and could question
advoc~ es lfsa "hot court," in order to
make the program interesting and lively].

Open Conference by Court
[NOTE:

This could take form of court conference
without any real attempt to come to a
definitive conclusion; or could take
form of Audience Questions (submitted in
writing) addressed to court members or
advocates].

-2-

4

.

AUDIENCE:

-

-

Invite, get acceptances, and have reserved seats
for certain people.
Suggestions - 1 Judge from
each State appellate system; 1 lawyer from each
State Bar; 1 Judge from each U. S. Circuit Court;
Judges from certain specialized courts; various
professors specializing in procedures.
(approximately 100 people - the remaining seats
for open admission:
approximately 200)

LAST 10 MINUTES:

Have everyone in attendance answer Questionnaire
addressing the Issues with specific questions to
provide some consensus.

FOLLOW-UP:

Write up meeting and pro and con arguments and
publish results in ABA Journal.

-3-

-

-

~µ

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH

CIRCUIT

.APR 20 Q
PAUL

H . RONEY

CIRCUIT

ST.

JUDGE

F E DERAL OFFICE BUILDING
PETERSBURG , FLORIDA 33701

April 17, 1978

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543
Dear Justice Powell:
You are getting an official invitation from Mr. Leon
Segan to participate in this program, but since I am co-chairman
I thought I might drop you a note about it.
The Appellate Judges' Conference, together with the
Lawyers Conference, of the American Bar Association is putting
on a program on Tuesday, August 8, 1978.
We want to explore the question of whether oral argument
in appellate courts should be allowed whenever requested by
counsel, or only when the court decides oral argument will be
helpful.
Inclosed is a general format for a kind of moot court
situation.
I know the demands on your time are great. We initially
thought of imposing on Justice Stevens or Justice Rehnquist,
but neither of them are going to attend the meeting and we find
that you are.
This is the type of thing that would require
little preparation on your part.
It will take a morning and
give our program great visibility. As you can see in the
proposal, we hope to follow up the program with a good analytical
pro-con article in the ABA Journal.
I hope that you will be
able to help us.

-

-

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
April 17, 1978
Page Two
Charles Alan Wright has agreed to be an advocate on one
side and we are exploring two or three other people of national
reputation to handle the other side of the argument. Our Chief
Judge John Brown has agreed to be on the bench.
I am sorry that you are not going to be at our Fifth
Circuit Conference this year. We will miss you.

Paul H. Roney
PHR:ehs
Incl.
cc:

Leon Segan, Esquire
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Nancy

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 18, 1978

ABA Program - August 8
I have agreed to take part in a "moot court" type
program during the ABA meeting in New York in August, the
subject being "Should Oral Argument on Appeal be Abolished
unless Requested by the Court?"
The correspondence in the enclosed file will
describe the program and its format.

See particularly the

letter from Judge Roney.
I would appreciate your checking the literature on

-

the pros and cons of oral argument at the appellate level.
Also see if there are any decided cases in which counsel
insisted upon a r ight of oral argument.
If relevant material is available, I would like a
"bench-type memo" reflecting the result of your research.
In addition, it would be helpful to have your suggestions
as to questions or points to bring up.
I doubt that you find any vast amount of helpful
mate r ial.

There may be some writing that would suggest o r

stimulate ideas and questions.
This is a stand-by project for you, and is not to
interfere with the Court work.

I would hope you would f i nd

time to do this before we end the Term - the best guess on

-

this now be i ng the last week in June.

L.F.P., Jr.

.;·/~~
.. ?
h i;ue~
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June 2, 1978

FROM:

LeOn Se~ n and Paul H. Roney

TO

Participants of ABA Program
ORAL ARGUMENT ON APPEAL:
COURT'S CHOICE OR COUNSEL'S CHOICE?
August 8, 1978 - New York City

Our program is now complete, scheduled for August 8,
1978 from 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. in New York City at the
American Bar Association's Annual Meeting.
Inclosed is the
program format with the names of all persons who will be
participants.
We are delighted you have agreed to participate.
In the latter part of June or in July, we will try
to provide information about the subject matter of the program
which may be helpful to both the advocates and the "Court."
Since there are no ABA funds to support this program,
it is our understanding that you will be responsible for your
own expenses, travel arrangements, and housing accommodations.
The Committee will provide transportation from your hotel to
the Courthouse and return on August 8.

Incl.
cc:

Hon. James D. Hopkins
Hon. Francis P. Murphy
Mr. Ernest S. Zavodnyik, ABA, Chicago
Mr. Stephen Goldspiel, ABA, Chicago
Mr. Howard S. Primer, ABA, Chicago

• r ...,_

~

~

-

-

ABA PROGRAM
1978 ANNUAL MEETING

ORAL ARGUMENT ON APPEAL:
COURT'S CHOICE OR COUNSEL'S CHOICE?
(A Judicial Administration Division Program Co-Sponsored by
The Lawyers Conference and the Appellate Judges' Conference)

DATE:

Tuesday, August 8, 1978

PLACE:

Courthouse
Appellate Division
First Department
27 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

TIME:

9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.

COURT PANEL:

Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543
Hon. John R. Brown
Chief Judge
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
U. S. Courthouse, Room 11501
Houston, Texas 77002
Hon. C. William O'Neill
)~
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of Ohio .
30 East Broad Street
Colwnbus, Ohio 43215

-

.,. .-:-_

...
J

-

Hon. Aaron Steuer
.)~~
Senior Judge
New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division
First Department
27 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10010
Hon. Mary M. Schroeder
Judge
· court of Appeals
Division One
State Capitol Building
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
Hon. Wade H. Mccree, Jr .
Solicitor General
of the United States
Washi ngton, D. C. 20530
Dean Dorothy W. Nelson
University of Southern California
Law School
University Park
Los Angeles, California 90007

ADVOCATES:

Professor Charles Alan Wright
University of Texas Law School
Red River
Austin, Texas 78705

Hon. Daniel M. Friedman
Chief Judge
u. S. Court of Claims
Washington, D. C. 20005

·~~ /4~~t~\
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

J UDIC IAL
ADM IN ISTRATION

1155 EAST 60TH ST., CHICAGO, ILLINO IS 60637

TELEPHONE ( 312 ) 947-4000

DIVISI ON
LAWYERS

CHA IRMA N
R . Stanley Lowe
97 Primrose
Casper, WY 82601
PAST CHAIRMAN
Howard Stern
125 Ellison St.
Paterson , NJ 07505
CHAIRMA N-ELECT
DeWitt Williams
P.O . Box 21926
Seattle. WA 98101
VI CE-C HAIRMAN
Paul F. Murray
2 Kay S tr eet
Newport . RI 02840
SECRETARY
Jo-Ann Grace
438 S . Mansfield
Los Angeles, CA 90036
EXECUTI VE COMMITTEE
James P Economos
111 W. Washington
Suite 2137
Chicago , IL 60602
Rex J. Hanson
702 Kearns Bldg .
Salt Lake City , UT 84101
Th omas S . Jackson
1828 " L " St NW
Washington , DC 20036
Jeanne S . Miller
407 Broadway
New Haven . IN 46774
Leon Segan
253 Broadway
New York . NY 10007
John A . Sutro
P.O Box 7880
San Franci sco . CA 94120
:ONFERENCE DELEGATES
TO JAD COUNCIL
Flo rence R . Peskoe
State H ouse Annex
Room 432
Trenton . NJ 08625
Jerome A . Hochberg
1990 " M " Street . N.W .
Washington , DC 20036
STAFF DIRECTOR
Stephen Goldspiel
1155 E 60th Street
Chicago , IL 60637
(312 ) 94 7-3981

June 14, 1978

JUff 1 9 1978

CO N FE RENCE

Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543
Dear Justice Powell:
As a co-Chairman together with Judge Paul H. Roney
of the program in which you are participating on August 8t
at the Appellate Division, First Department, Courthouse in
New York City, I am writing to you to obtain your - permission
to video-tape the program. Judge Roney and I have agreed
that if anyone of the participants in the program does not
wish to have this program video-taped, we will not arrange
for same.
I have discussed this with Presiding Justice
Murphy of the Appellate Division, First Department, and
Justice Steuer, who is a participant, and both have consented to video-taping of the program.
It is understood that the video-tape will be used for
no other purpose but for recording the proceeding and for
ducational objectives under the guidance and con
the American Bar Association.
_
I would appreciate your considering what has been proposed.
I will telephone you in a few days to obtain your
view on this subject.
Meanwhile, please rest assured that we have made
arrangements for transportation from your hotel to the
Courthouse and back. There will also be a continentalstyle breakfast at the Courthouse for you and the other
participants prior to the program.

LS:cf
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July 25, 1978

Hon. Daniel M. Friedman, Chief Judge
United States Court of Claims
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
Professor Charles Alan Wright
University of Texas Law School
Red River
Austin, Texas 78705
Dear "Advocates"
Enclosed is some material which may be helpful to you in
preparation for the program on August 8.
The fronts of the two ''attitudes" pamphlets, together with
the Table of Contents, show what was in the complete study
from which I have xeroxed what seemed to me to be the relevant
portions.
I will have both of these books with me in New York,
if either of you spot anything ~n the Table of Contents which
I have not included that you might want to see.
The small pages concerning sc reening, oral argument, and the
l .ike are taken from a book called EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN
APPEALS : METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS, a product of the
American Bar Association Task Force on Appellate Procedure.
This was developed in the summer of 1977, and is used in
connection with the seminars sponsored by the Appellate Judges
Conference of the ABA.
I have talked to both of you about the presentation.
It is
agreed that Judge Friedman will open, Professor Wright will
argue second, and Judge Friedman will take a few minutes for
rebuttal. We probably will not follow time restrictions too
clo?ely. We hope that questions from the bench will enliven
the program.
The Presiding Justice will have the authority
to keep the prog ram moving.

.

__

-

Hon. Daniel M. Friedman, Chief Judge
Professor Charles Alan Wright
Page 2
July 25, 1978

Probably no more than 30 minutes for the opening, 30 to 40
minutes for Professor Wright, and perhaps 10 m1nutes of
rebuttal will be appropriate.
As I told each of you on the telephone today,
to meet at 4:00 p.m. on Monday afternoon with
and such other members of the "court" who can
We will let you know the place of the meeting
has been settled.

we are going
Justice Powell
be present.
as soon as it

Mr. Leon Segan, my co-chairman from the Lawyers Conference,
will be generally in charge of the physical arrangements in
New York.
His office telephone number is:
212-964-2040.

Warm(]~
Paul H. Roney

PHR/ber
Enclosures ·
cc:
Mr. Justice Powell
cc:
Mr. Leon Segan

PBS

~
,.,

MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:

RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell

Paul
Decisions Without Oral Argument by This Court
August 1, 1978
As you observed, this Court disposes of a variety of

matters on their merits without the benefit of briefing or oral
argument.

-

For example, under the doctrine of Hicks v. Miranda,

422 U.S. 332 (1975), summary dispositions of cases in which this
Court has appellate jurisdiction are regarded as having
precedential effect.

Occasionally questions of some significance

are disposed of in this manner.

E.g., Rivera v. Delaware, 429

U.S. 877 (1976) (burden of proof on insanity):

Doe v.

Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (consensual sodomy).
Beyond this general practice, however, the Court in some
instances has developed fairly important doctrines through

------

summary disposition of a series of related cases.
The example you spoke of on the phone was the

development of the rule that plaintiffs seeking relief under§
1983 need not exhaust state administrative remedies before filing
suit in a federal court.

-

As you noted in your concurrence in

Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), "[t]his far-reaching

-

2.

conclusion was arrived at largely without the benefit of briefing
and argument."

Id. at 186 n.*;

U.S. 249 (1971);

see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404

Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968);

Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
Another example is the extension of Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to public facilities other than
schools.

Although the rationale of that decision depended

heavily on the special role of education in our society, the
antidiscrimination principle developed by it soon was applied to
a variety of public accomodations.

See New Orlea/¾i City Park

Imp. Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks);
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses);

-

350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses);

Gayle v.

Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,

350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
On occasion this Court has reversed judgments of lower
courts without briefing or argument.

Although these cases cannot

be described as indicating major doctrinal innovations, the
issues addressed have not always been without general
significance.

My favorite of this genre is Vachon v. New

Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974), where the Court reversed a
conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor on a
"no evidence" ground not raised below, thereby avoiding the
determination of difficult First Amendment and mens rea issues.

----

Other examples of recent summary reversals include Pennsylvania

-

v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (stop and frisk);

Idaho Dept. of

Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977) (equal protection);

-

3.

County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) (equal protection);
Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 425 U.S. 268
(1976) (state taxation of national bank);
U.S. 67

(1975) (Fourth Amendment);

Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61

(1975) (waiver of double jeopardy claim);
415 U.S. 697 (1974) (First Amendment).
referred

Texas v. White, 423

Eaton v. City of Tulsa,

The example to which you

is Berry v. Doles, 46 U.S.L.W. 3789 (Jun. 26, 1978),

which reversed a court order under the Voting Rights Act that
denied certain prospective relief with respect to a change in
election terms.

You questioned the need to order further relief

in light of the trivial nature of the change but concurred in the

-

-

judgment because it left open the possibility the court below
could still deny relief.

lfp/ss
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DECISIONS WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) - summary
disposition of cases on appea l (appellate jurisdiction).
Have precedential effect.
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901
(1976) - consentual sodomy cr i minal statute sustained.

Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) Extending Monroe v. Pape to require no exhaustion of state
administrative remedies.

Brown v. Board of Education was extended several
times by affirmances without oral argument:
New Orleans City Park Ass'n. v. Detiege,
358 U.S. 54 (public parks).
Gale v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (buses).
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(golf courses).

* *

*

The Cour.t has even reversed summarily:
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
(Pennsylvania stop and frisk case).
Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S.
100 (an equal protection issue).

Berry v. Doles, June 26, 1978 - the Voting
Rights Act case t ·rom Georgia.
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and federal judicial circuit.

The program sponsors will be pleased

to receive written comments from any in attendance, as it is
intended that an article be published reflecting the content of
this program .

Mr. Leon Segan,
Judge Paul H. Roney
Co-Chairmen

(9

L~ ~ ~c~(~

5/f~o>-:f~

CY?~r~~

'

.
Program Participants

ADVOCATES

Daniel M. Friedman - Chief Judge, United States Court of Claims.
Former First Deputy Solicitor General of the United States. With
the Office of Solicitor General for 19 years. Judge Friedman has
argued over 75 cases before the United States Supreme Court, and
briefed hundreds of them.
Columbia University (A.B.) Columbia
Law School (LL.B.)
Charles Alan Wright - Professor of Law, University of Texas.
Specializing in federal practice and procedure, Professor Wright
has taught law at the Universities of Minnesota, Yale , Pennsylvania,
Harvard, Michigan, Colorado, North Carolina, California and Kent
(Cant erbury , England). He has been involved in writing almost 15
books on federal practice and procedure, civil and criminal. He
frequently appears in appellate courts, and has argued cases before
the United States Supreme Court. Wesleyan University, Middletown,
Conn. (B.A.) Yale University Law School (LL.B.)

COURT PANEL

Lewis F. Powell, Jr. - Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court. Former President: American Bar Association and American
Coll ege of Trial Lawyers. Washington and Lee University (B.S. and
LL.B.); Harvard Law School (LL.M.)
John R. Brown - Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit. Most Senior Chief Circuit Judge in United States.
University of Nebraska (A.B.); University of Michigan (.J.D.)
C. William O'Neill - Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio. Chairman,
National Conference of Chief Justices. Fo rmerly : Speaker, House of
Representatives, Ohio; Attorney General, Ohio; Governor, Ohio.
Marietta College (A.B.); Ohio State University Law School (J.D.)
Aaron Steuer - Senior Jud ge , New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, First Department. Justice Stever has been a jud ge for
almost 50 years. Harvard College (A.B.); Columbia Law School (LL.B.)
Mary M. Schroeder - Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals. Member:
Appellate Advocacy Committee of the ABA Appellate Judges' Conference;
Co-Chairman, Arizona Appellate Project - An Experiment in Expedited
Appellate Review.
Swarthmore College (A.B.); University of Chicago
Law School (J.D.)

.,

t

...

COURT PANEL (cont'd)

Wade H. McCree, Jr. - Solicitor General of the United States.
Former Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Fisk University (A.B.); Harvard Law School (LL.B.)
Dorothy W. Nelson - Dean and Professor of Law, University of
Southern California Law Center. Chairman, Committee on Education
in Judicial Administration of the ABA Judicial Administration
Division; Vice President, American Judicature Society; author:
Judicial Administration and the Administration of Justice (West)
1974. University of California (A.B.); School of Law, University
of California, Los Angeles (J.D.); University of Southern
California Law Center (LL.M.)

.~ ~
J.';7",.,_? '_ph-<- ~~ ~ - ~
~ ? t - z r ~-1-~S! . ~ ~
~

~.

~ ~

~~ ~~

-

--f ~

~ -~ /

?lu.L /:;

~ :,

/-hz--v

C/}

~ ~~ 'f/'4fa..

a.,._.,~ ~-,4, -~ ~,k:

5''.s- ~ ~~~

lo/JZ- -

5"1?o

? .

~~q/6~

~7o

of~~~
-fo~~~
~ ~ 2:../?

:f

...
~
~_£-

~

. £cw /§r
~

~~~(....,,1'

~~t,v--

I (

--

~~ c:::::(__;

d,i__/~

c:::2--2../

-1-o

~ d&9 tt-u

¢-o

0

'"9~~~

z . s~-r

. ,. ~

~--=--."""1..~-<--"/

~

~;,

&1/Y

P<.,/~

L4~:r ~

~

c~~,H~~ft/~~1<1
u

~

12--£---f-r,,,~~ ~ - - -

~~

~~ V2-- ~
l-,vv ~
q ~ ~ ~~ ~~
~~_;rc..,,,'I,~

~~~~~

~~ ~ ~ ~½~

-,..

~~~~

\I

-

~ Y--~.

:.
~

. .

~~~~ .·
~ ~~ R/3A s ~1 /?73/f T ~
~UY'--~~~-

~ ~ ~~(1"177)

&2-)

~

-

~.

,

~~~
t,',

(,t.)
L5)

5'~

~~-~ZJ

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~

-

-.....

C..\.~/L?~-rr,,

~~-~~71/~'l-/~~

~~~/~ o/_~_ ~ h ~ v . . . - ~
~??:/ - (u; ·'iJ?i)- :s, n . ~~
./1

(oLPl}~-/1~

,.

~ rW? ~ ~ f?/s ~ -,

.

( ~ d ) ~ d ~ ·t

___yy>7 , ~

~ /;; ~

;:;

~~

--=----=---

,~

~~
~2J ~ / l - ~----/1

~<ii'

(~c//=r)

~~ fe l'f?ol

(,,~

~~~,,

~6

rp<!) ~

(~~)

:

./1

~d

~~~ ~

(~~,)~-.,,,~
~/l~b
(

/I

.~

{~)
~) -

~
~

~ ~ c l ~ '4-( ~~

~ ~~

·,~µ~
i..-,,..-,....,~,~~

~~

. ~ fa ~ 7 ? ? 0-n/)~~
~

./1

.

~/1

--

~-(,tf?l)t!27P' ~
~

,_

?-<1f/

/1

-~-,,,~

-~)~~~
~~~~ ~

i~ ~ £

-~

•,

MEMORANDUM

TO:
FROM:

Mr. Justice Powell
July 10, 1978

Nancy

RE:

ABA Panel on Oral Argument

The subject of the panel is "Oral Argument:
Court's Choice or Counsel's Choice?"

This topic seems to

have been chosen because of the growing practice in the
federal courts of appeals of hearing oral argument only in
selected cases.

The Second Circuit appears to be the only

Circuit that still has oral a r gument in all appeals.
Limiting oral argument is only one facet of the
CAs' recent endeavors to combat the increasing congestion
and backlogs of appeals and otherwise to improve the
appellate process.

Most of the articles that I found which

discussed reform of oral argument focused primarily on
reforming the appellate process in general.

Many of the

other articles on oral argument were addressed primarily to

2.

practitioners; these dealt with the gains to be realized
from effective oral argument and contained "how to" lessons
on good oral advocacy.

Surprisingly, the literature in

these two categories (especially the latter) was abundant.
I will try not to bore you with the fairly repetitious
contents of the many articles I read.
will cover four general areas:

(1)

Instead, this memo
an overview of the

current problems and reforms in the federal appellate
system;

(2) the main purposes and benefits of oral

argument;

(3) screening procedures, including the

elimination of oral argument, now existent in many of the
federal CAs; and

(4) case law on the right to oral argument.

Where appropriate, I have attached copies of
particularly illuminating articles or ones I thought you
might find interesting.

In case you do not have the time

or inclination to read them, however, I also have
summarized their contents in this memo.
Much of the information I've found probably is not
new to you, in view of your first-hand experience as a
Justice and as a lawyer well acquainted with efforts at
reforming the judicial system.

I have included such

information anyway, in the interest of completeness.

I.

An Overview

Procedural reforms addressed to the curtailment of
oral argument are but a small part of current attempts to
streamline the federal appellate system.

(Similar efforts

3.

of course are taking place in the state court systems, but
most of the literature concerns reforms in the federal
system.)

As expressed by Chief Judge Kaufman of the Second

Circuit, two main aims of judicial reform are the reduction
of the cost of justice--by means of increasing efficiency,
shortening the litigation process, and (where appropriate)
diverting disputes from the courts; and the improvement of
the calibre of justice, by better selection and training of
judges and jurors, specialization of decisionmakers, and
improving the quality of information available to the
decisionmaker

(through the provision of advisors to courts

and bettering the quality of counsel).

Kaufman, Judicial

Reform in the Next Century, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1976).
Some suggested means of effecting judicial reform
involve significant changes in the federal judicial
structure.

The most radical suggestions involve the

creation of new courts, such as a new layer of federal
appellate courts either between the CAs and the Supreme
Court or between the district courts and the CAs; the
reduction of federal jurisdiction; or making appeals to the
CAs discretionary rather than a matter of right.

Judge

Traynor of California has argued that the way to reduce the
burden on appellate courts is to make the substantive law
more clear, so that many of the appeals that now require
research and opinions could be disposed of more summarily.
While I doubt that anyone would object to clarifying the
substantive law, this does not seem like a ready answer to
the problem of congestion in the appellate courts.

4•

The proposals and reforms involving oral argument
generally are addressed to only the first two goals
mentioned by Judge Kaufman--increasing efficiency and
shortening the litigation process.

The congested state of

the dockets of the federal Courts of Appeals is a familiar
subject which has received the attention of many judges and
commentators.

Each author has suggestions for reducing the

burden on the federal courts, and curtailing oral argument
seems to me to be a very minor aspect of the general
campaign.
Curtailment of oral argument is part of the reform
generally known as "case screening" or differentiated case
processing, which also includes the summary disposition of
some cases without signed opinions.

One of the leading

articles on differentiated case processing is Meador,
Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 Va.
L. Rev. 255

(1975).

types of innovation:

(The article also deals with two other
(1) affirmative case management, by

means of enforcing rules for the handling of appeals; and
(2) the use of central staff attorneys to aid the judges
and their personal staffs.)

The aims of the reforms

discussed in the Meador article are to help the
decisionmaking process as it now exists, not to change that
process.

"Specifically, these innovations seek to ensure

that the perfection and decision of appeals is expedited
and the court's total productivity is increased, without
sacrificing adequate and deliberate consideration by

5.
judges, collegiality of decisions, and the rendering of
justice in fact and in appearance."

II.

Id., at 256-57.

Purposes and Benefits of Oral Argument

In all the literature I read, the consensus seems
to be that oral argument is of value for lawyers and judges
alike.

Articles by both lawyers and judges emphasized the

importance of oral argument ~

A few authors expressed the

view that oral argument often is unhelpful, either because
the judges come to the argument "cold" or because the
lawyers do not use their argument time effectively, or
both; but these were criticisms of poorly used oral
argument.

Everyone seemed to agree--not surprisingly--that

good oral argument is extremely valuable.
One of the main benefits of oral argument, in the
minds of the judge- and lawyer-authors, is that it is the
only interpersonal aspect of the appeal.

It was said often

that oral argument is the only time when the lawyers have
the undivided attention of the court, which reassures the
lawyers that the judges are focusing on his case at least
for that period of time; and it lets the judges seek
clarification from the lawyers.

Many authors remarked that

a printed brief cannot answer questions or respond to the
judges' concerns about the case.

Oral argument is not of

much value, however, when the judges are unprepared or
unfamiliar with the case, because then argument is just the
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lawyer's rehashing of ideas that could (and should) have
been in the brief.

For this reason, there is much force to

the contention that oral argument is of value only when
desired by the court, and that it could be dispensed with
except when the court specifically requests it.
The problem I have with this argument, however, is
that judges often do not know in advance that something
illuminating will come out at oral argument, for example,
when a question occurs to one judge as a follow-up on a
response given to the question of another judge.

And I

doubt that judges would request argument simply because
they wanted to clarify one or two points in a brief.

Such

clarification could be accomplished more easily by
requesting a written response or a supplemental brief.

In

fact, such requests are made in some Courts of Appeals
today.

Leventhal, Appellate Procedures:

Design,

Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
432, 445-46

(1976).

Since spontaneity is one of the primary advantages
of oral argument, I doubt that the beneficial functions of
oral argument would be served by scheduling argument only
when the judges know ahead of time that they have questions
to ask.

Although judges probably would request oral

argument in all cases of any significance, some cases in
which oral argument might turn out to be helpful might go
unargued.

(WJB has stated that for him, "oral argument is

the absolutely indispensable ingredient of appellate
advocacy.

.

[O]ften my whole notion of what a case is

7•

about crystallizes at oral argument.

This happens even

though I read all the briefs before oral argument . . . . "
Fitzgerald

&

Hartnett, Effective Oral Argument, 18 Prac.

Lawyer 51 (1972) (quoting Harvard Law School Occasional
Pamphlet No. 9, at 22-23 (1967)) .)
It has been noted in some of the literature that
the American practice of relying almost exclusively on the
briefs is very different from the English practice, in
which there is no briefing and oral argument is the main
form of advocacy.

Meador claims that the Second Circuit's

current practice of announcing some decisions from the
bench, rather than in written opinions, resembles the
English practice and actually amounts to an elevation of
the function of oral argument at a time when the other
Circuits are cutting back.
I would have to take issue with Meador's
observation, however, because it seems to me that the
Second Circuit's new procedure relegates oral argument
almost to meaninglessness.

Meador is right, of course,

that in order to announce a decision from the bench, oral
argument must take place.

Thus in the Second Circuit

argument cannot be eliminated even in cases where it is not
likely to be useful because those are the cases in which it
is more likely that an announcement from the bench will be
used instead of a written, signed opinion.

But the fact

that the decision can be announced orally immediately after
the argument indicates that the judges already have reached
agreement as to the proper disposition of the case before

8•

even hearing argument; often the oral announcement of the
decision is a pre-prepared speech (just like your
statements made when announcing a decision).

Thus I would

disagree that oral argument in the Second Circuit is more
significant than it used to be.
Since oral argument used to be important and took
much longer than it does today, it is generally observed
that the only reason for cutting back on oral argument, or
eliminating it altogether, is the need to save judicial
time at some stage of the processing of an appeal.

Often

elimination of oral argument is tied to other facets of
case screening, such as the decision to dispose of a case
summarily (without signed opinion).

You might ask the moot

court participants whether, as lawyers, they would object
more to a summary disposition of an appeal or the denial or
oral argument time.

(Most lawyers would object to either,

but I wonder which one would be more troublesome.

I tend

to think it would depend on the nature of the particular
case.)
One theory has been espoused that attributes the
decline in importance of oral argument to something other
than time constraints.

Erwin Griswold has mused that oral

argument has become less important as judges have come to
rely more heavily on law clerks.

He surmises that law

clerks have come to perform the function formerly performed
by the lawyer-advocates, as aids to judges in deciding
cases.

See Griswold, Appellate Advocacy:

With Particular

1-t-

9.
Reference to the United States Supreme Court, 44 N.Y. State
Bar Journal 375, 380-82 (1972).

While judges of yore

turned to the lawyers for the opposing sides to clarify
difficult points of law or complexities in the record,
today's judge tends to ask his law clerk to figure out the
problem.

This theory seems plausible to me; I would guess

that judges would ask more questions of lawyers at argument
if they did not have law clerks available as sounding
boards and research aids.
The fact that effective oral argument is a
valuable tool in deciding some cases does not necessarily
mean, however, that oral argument should be granted in
every case.

The purpose of the screening procedures

discussed in the next section is to determine in which
cases the decisionmaking process will be sufficiently
benefitted by oral argument to justify the necessary
expenditure of time.

III.

Screening Procedures

A.

In General

The theory behind case screening is that all cases
do not require the same treatment.

Today there are special

procedures for very large cases (such as class actions or
multidistrict litigation) or for very small cases (small
claims court), but all intermediate cases basically are
treated the same.

Yet innovations are being implemented to

10.
change this.

In the Second Circuit and in one of New York

State's appellate divisions, a Civil Appeals Management

C&;4u

Program (CAMP) has been instituted, which is aimed at

settling cases at the appellate level through the use of a
pre-argument settlement conference conducted by a staff
attorney.

See Birnbaum

&

Ellman, Pre-Argument Settlement

Process in an Intermediate Appellate Court, 43 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 31 (1976); Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference:

An

Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 Colum. L. Rev~ 1094

(1974).

Chief Judge Kaufman has explained the Second

Circuit's institution of CAMP in terms of the desire to
preserve oral argument in every appeal:

~f)J'vJP
-

"The pre-argument conference plan . . .
preserves the right of parties to obtain oral
argument, and relies 2120n their voluntary
termination of -the appeal to achieve -ju dicial
e conomy. The Second Circuit has jealously guarded
the opportunity for oral argument not only because
it assists judges by clarifying issues raised in
the briefs, but also because it gives parties
their day in court, assuring them that their case
has received careful and complete judicial
scrutiny.
It was largely the need to preserve the
possibility of oral argument that stimulated the
implementation of this reform.
In addition, CAMP
improves on alternative procedures by encouraging
settlement or narrowing the issues at an early
stage, before most of the energy, resources and
time ordinarily required for an appeal have been
expended by counsel, parties and the court."
Id. at 1095.
The Second Circuit's approach may be thought to
place the cart before the horse, by attempting to abort
whole appeals rather than to simplify the appellate
process.

More common in the other circuits are the kind of

screening procedures used in the Fifth Circuit.

__.J,

Eliminating oral argument in some cases is one facet of

12.
( rio

these latter procedures.
B.

Oral Argument Screening

As mentioned above, the Second Circuit appears to
be the only federal appellate court that has retained oral
argument in every case.

(Not every case is allotted the

same amount of time, however; the presiding judge reviews
the briefs before argument and allots an amount of time for
argument commensurate with the importance and difficulty of
the case.

Some cases receive only 5 minutes per side ~or

oral argument.)

The Fifth Circuit's screening procedure

has been discussed more than others in the literature,
perhaps because that Circuit's overload made it a leader in
finding ways to make the appellate process more efficient.
I am attaching a copy of the best article I found
on screening procedures, which is worth skimming in its
entirety.

(It is Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures

in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 Wash.
257.)

u.

L.Q.

The article contentrates on the procedure used by CA

5, contains statistics on the increased productivity
attributable to the partial elimination of oral argument as
well as that attributable to the use of summary
dispositions, and discusses some of the grounds on which
the denial of oral argument could be and has been
challenged.
A brief summary of the Haworth article may be
useful to you.
sections.)

(I've also marked the most relevant

At pages 265-67 are reproduced the texts of

p-

!I)

13.
the various circuits' rules on oral argument.

The

description of CA S's classification of cases begins at
275.

The cases are divided into Classes I-IV:

t.

Class I

cases are those without merit and therefore do not require
oral argument; Class II cases may be meritorious but
nevertheless do not require argument (either because the
issues are well-defined and clear or because the briefs are
so good that argument would not add anything); Class III
and Class IV cases receive either full

(30 minutes) or

limited (15 minutes) oral argument.
In CA 5, if a case is not given oral argument but
later there is any disagreement or doubt about the proper
disposition of the case, the case is restored to the
regular court calendar and is scheduled for argument.
does not happen with very many cases, however.
n. 117.

This

Id. at 276

The CA 5 judges claim that there are three

-

safeguards to ensure that cases are not improperly disposed
of without oral argument:

(1) the initial decision to

place a case on the summary calendar is made by the judges
assigned to hear a case, not by law clerks or other staff;
(2) the decision to place a case on the summary calendar
must be unanimous; and (3) as just described, the decision
on the merits must be unanimous or the case will be
restored to the regular calendar.

Id. at 276-77.

The procedure in CA 8 is a similar.

A case is

sent to an initiating judge on the panel assigned to the
case.

If he thinks the case does not require oral

~
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argument, he prepares a short opinion and forwards it to
the next judge on the panel.

If the second judge agrees

with the disposition and the opinion, he forwards it to the
third judge on the panel.

Id. at 277 n. 118.

Haworth notes that not only simple cases are
decided without oral argument.

In 1972, signed opinions

issued in 18.5% of Class II cases in CA 5.

See,~-,

Imperial Hornes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (CA 5 1972),
in which the CA S's decision created a conflict with a
previous decision of CA 6.

But Haworth concludes that most

civil cases in which argument is denied are cases in which
appeals should not have been taken, because most appellate
briefing is not so good as to obviate the need for oral
argument.

In other words, it is the rare case in which

argument is denied simply because the briefing is so good.
Haworth's assessment of the CA 5 program is very
"----...
favorable.
I will not go into his productivity statistics,
which you may glean from all the tables in the article.

He

concludes that the CA 5 judges have experienced a
"remarkable increase" in productivity because of their
curtailment of oral argument and their use of summary
dispositions under Rule 21.

He also concludes that there

has been a large increase in productivity (34.4%)

-

--..---....

- - -

-

attributable exclusively to the elimination of oral

------~

-

---

- -

~

argument, even without the use of summary dispositions.
derives this conclusion from data from 1968-1970, a time
period during which the CA used screening to limit oral

He
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argument but did not yet use orders and unsigned opinions
in simple cases.

Id. at 283-84.

Haworth claims that the CA 5 statistics rebut the
assertion of Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of
Appeals:

The Threat to the Function of Review and the

National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542 (1969), that oral
argument does not take up so much of a judge's time that
its elimination could lead to significant improvements in
judicial productivity.

(Carrington estimated that oral

argument only takes about 200 hours a year per judge.)
Haworth offers two possible explanations for the great
productivity increase in CA 5 from the curtailment of oral
argument:

(1)

-------

elimination of oral argument not only frees

the judge's time that otherwise would be spend listening to

-

argument, but also saves him all the time that otherwise
~

------ ...

would go into preparation for argument (including clerks'
time preparing bench memos, etc.); and (2) because of the
geography of CA 5, eliminating oral argument in many cases
saves a lot of travel time for the judges who have to come
from all over the territory covered by the Fifth Cirucit,
and also avoids the disruption of a judge's work schedule
attendant upon moving to another city for at least one week
a month.
My own opinion is that the latter factor is far
more significant than the former, if we are proceeding on
the assumption that the quality of judging has not declined
in the course of eliminating oral argument.

I say this

because Haworth's first explanation proceeds from the

16.
premise that eliminating oral argument obviates the need
for each judge to have bench memos prepared and to become
fully familiar with the case.

He seems to assume that the

elimination of oral argument in a particular case also
eliminates a lot of the preparatory work done by the two
judges who do not end up drafting the panel's opinion.

But

I would hope that eliminating oral argument would not mean
that the only judge who sought to understand the case fully
was the one assigned to draft the opinion.

~

And unless this

is the case, eliminating oral argument should not eliminate
preparation of bench memos

(or whatever kind of help the

judge formerly enlisted from his clerks) or the judge's own
efforts to comprehend the case as fully as possible.
Thus my own opinion would be that the only time

M-k.-

saving in eliminating oral argument is in actual time spent
on the bench and travel time.
may be significant.

The disruption factor also

(I know that I rarely accomplished

very much during the one week a month that we spent in New
York City during CA 2 sittings.)

I wonder whether the

elimination of oral argument would lead to great increases
in productivity in a circuit such as the D.C. Circuit,
where the judges do not travel at all, or even in circuits
where the travel is not terribly onerous (such as the
Second Circuit).

IV.

Objections to denial of oral argument

You asked whether there had been any cases in
which counsel insisted on a right to oral argument.

(..

~

•.
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Apparently in some circuits, such as the Ninth, the panel
will go through the screening process and then indicate to
counsel that the case is suitable for submission without

--

argument; but then oral argument will be allowed if counsel

~o request.

In other circuits, sucfi as the Fifth, the

panel's decision is final (subject to the qualifications
discussed in the preceding section, when a judge has
reservations about the disposition or disagreement with
aspects of the opinion).
The Haworth article contains an excellent
discussion of the various legal theories on which a right
to oral argument might be premised, plus citation of
numerous cases in which courts have rejected the contention
that due process requires oral argument on every point of
law in question.

The discussion is at pages 289-309.

Haworth discusses three basic theories on which it
j,, an
case
could be argued that there is a right to oral argumen .
I

i)

-

The first is the constitutional requirement of due
process.

This argument has been rejected by the Supreme

Court when asserted in the context of administrative
proceedings, see FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S.
265 (1949); and several federal CAs have extended the
rationale of FCC v. WJR to judicial appeals, holding that
oral argument on appeal is discretionary.
so ~~

The main cases

come from CA 5, ~ - , Isbell Enterprises, Inc.

v. Citizens Casualty Co., 431 F.2d 409

(CA 5 1970); Huth v.

Southern Pacif. Co., 417 F.2d 526 (CA 5 1969); Murphy v.
Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804 (CA 5 1969); Groendyke

C.f)q

•,
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Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (CA 5 1969), but
there also are decisions in other circuits that merely
state without discussion that due process does not require
oral argument on every legal issue.
Haworth, at 294 n. 203.

See cases cited in

(The CA 5 opinions cited above all

were written by Chief Judge Brown, and they also contain
discussions of the screening process, in case you are
interested in reading CA S's own description of its

*

process.)

Haworth also cites several cases on related
points,~-, cases holding that there is no right to oral
argument on a motion for rehearing or rehearing en bane; a
conflict between CAs 8 and 9 on whether oral argument may
be denied by a district court when that court intends to
grant a summary judgment motion; and cases in which the
Supreme Court has declined to review CA decisions when the
denial of oral argument was asserted as error.
The second and third arguments against denial of

--

-

oral argument are based on 28 U.S.C. § 46 and Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 34.
at pages 300-309.

These are discussed by Haworth

---

They do not seem to me to have any more

merit than the due process argument.

V.

Conclusion

I hope this memo has been helpful in giving you a
general idea of what has been written on this subject in
recent years.

As you expected, the literature is pretty
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repetitious.

Most authors seem to favor the procedural

reforms instituted in CA 5 and elsewhere, because of the
marked increase in productivity made possible by
eliminating oral argument in many cases, especially when
that form of screening is combined with the use of summary
d~

s, without signed opinions.

I suppose if

anything is dispensable, it is oral argument, especially
when the judicial panels retain control over their docket ~

.-

,~~

so that they can have oral argument when they believe it (
will aid them in deciding cases.

I would imagine, however,

that there is significant dissatisfaction with this
short-cut among appellate lawyers.
I have not suggested many questions for you to ask
because this topic does not lend itself readily to probing
analysis.

Since no one seems to advocate the elimination

of oral argument except as a time-saving device, there is
not much to debate as to the intrinsic value of oral
argument.

And, as mentioned above, if the CAs absolutely

--

must cut back on something, the obvious place to cut is
oral argument.

I think the main question I would pose to the
advocates of eliminating oral argument except when

~
~

requested would be whether they think it really saves that
much time in courts where travel is not a major problem,
like the D.C. Circuit or, for that matter, the Supreme
Court.

If these partisans believe that significant amounts

of time could be saved even in those courts, I would ask if

·

~.
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that would not necessarily entail a cut-back in the
judicial attention given to each case.

It seems to me that

the only benefit in the current screening procedures is
that all three members of a panel do not prepare thoroughly
and make up their minds on a case (both as to disposition
and rationale) before seeing a proposed opinion in the
case.

And if this is so, then I think part of the

of a three-member panel has been lost.

The second two

judges probably do little more in most cases than
rubber-stamp the initiating judge's proposed disposition
and opinion.

This seems like a radical change in the

handling of federal appeals, and it seems to me to go
beyond the purely administrative aims of the screening
procedure.

N.B.
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